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Semantics and symbol grounding  
in Turing machine processes
The symbol grounding problem is one of the most important ques-
tions encountered in Artificial Intelligence research. The problem 
is very old and repeatedly discussed.1 It received special attention 
from Steven Harnad.2 There are many articles attempting to de-
scribe the way to solve this problem.3 Despite this, works on Arti-
ficial Intelligence still face obstacles to proper embedding of sym-
bols of artificial systems.
The difficulty of the symbol grounding problem is that we cannot 
accurately determine how to depict the content of a representative 
element in a symbolic system – how sensory data affects the whole 
of symbolic representations. Likewise, we do not know how sensory 
1 See A. Cangelosi, A. Greco, S. Harnad, Symbol Grounding and the Symbolic 
Theft Hypothesis, in: Simulating the Evolution of Language, ed. A. Cangelosi, D. Pa-
risi, London 2002; S. Harnad, The Symbol Grounding Problem, “Physica D: Nonli-
near Phenomena” 42 (1990) iss. 1, p. 335–346; K. MacDorman, Cognitive Robotics. 
Grounding Symbols through Sensorimotor Integration, “Journal of the Robotics So-
ciety of Japan” 17 (1999) no. 1, p. 20–24.
2 See Professor Stevan Harnad, http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/people/harnad 
(22.11.2017).
3 See e.g. L. Steels, The Symbol Grounding Problem Has Been Solved, so Wha-
t’s Next, “Symbols and Embodiment: Debates on Meaning and Cognition” (2008), 
p. 223–244; M. Taddeo, L. Floridi, Solving the Symbol Grounding Problem: a Criti-
cal Review of Fifteen Years of Research, “Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Ar-
tificial Intelligence” 17 (2005) iss. 4, p. 419–445.
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data influences the totality of symbolic representations. The problem 
is related to cognitive science, but it directly influences the process of 
creating intelligent systems. Such systems have to relate directly to 
the real world in order to develop cognitive skills and thus perform 
intelligent tasks. Meanwhile, the existing symbolic systems (irre-
spective of their intelligent or autonomous actions) do not use sym-
bols belonging to them, but ones owned by their human architects.
An artificial symbolic system is the result of a double translation 
of the world. Firstly, the external symbols are translated by a pro-
grammer into the language of human symbols. Secondly, they are 
transformed into a formal language, which can be implemented in 
the machine. That is exactly the issue we are dealing with in the 
problem of grounding. The symbols of the artificial system are not 
related to the world directly, but indirectly through the mind and 
the language of human maker. Therefore, symbols processed by the 
machine are semantically foreign to its system. They are not con-
nected neither to the world nor to the internal machine environment.
The creators of the contemporary computational theory were math-
ematicians and logicians.4 In their work, they did not consider phys-
ical and cognitive processes. It was much later that their successors 
understood there was a need to consider the problem of computation 
as related to the problem of the mind. For decades, the field of Artifi-
cial Intelligence has developed in a computational paradigm, which 
has been associated with computer science since its inception.
1. Question of computation
One of the keystones of this area remains the Church-Turing Thesis.5 
The Church-Turing Thesis states that any physical problem for which 
there is an effective algorithm of its solution can be solved by a Tu-
4 The major researchers were Alonzo Church, Alan Turing, Kurt Gödel, John 
von Neumann.
5 See B. J. Copeland, The Church-Turing Thesis, in: The Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing 
(28.11.2017).
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ring machine. Within formal operations, all logical inferences, com-
putations, and proofs can be made by the machine. However, there 
are still open questions: do living organisms “calculate” things? Are 
there things that are not computable in the formal sense?
Church-Turing Thesis generalization for physical system assumed 
that everything a physical system can do can also be done by compu-
tation. This physical Church-Turing Thesis takes two versions: weak 
and strong, depending on whether all physical systems are assumed 
to be formally equivalent to computers, or whether all physical sys-
tems are computers. This distinction provides the essential problem 
of computationalism – the thesis that cognition is only a form of com-
putation. Analogously, this thesis comes in a weak and strong form. 
There are also alternative views on the features of computations. 
One of them presents a conviction that there are states not formal-
ized yet, while the other assumes that there are states that cannot 
be formalized at all. It seems that in the latter case one should com-
pletely reject computationalism and assume that the Church-Turing 
Thesis is false. Such a solution would be trivial, because the CHT is 
supported inductively by the computational theory.6 This rejection 
would also result, on the one hand, in abandonment of considera-
tions concerning the nature of symbolic systems, and on the other, 
in renunciation of research on intelligent systems. Consequently, 
the assumption of equality between computations and cognition al-
lows us to better understand the nature of both and recognize the 
significant differences between them. Likewise, adopting the thesis 
as potentially true assumes that grounding of symbols of an artifi-
cial system in the natural world is possible, and the symbol ground-
ing problem may be solved.
In computers, the equivalent of cognitive processes are compu-
tations. Computations are the interpretation of symbol processing. 
Symbols are objects that are manipulated on rules based on their 
shapes.7 Symbols in an artificial system are interpreted as having 
6 See B. J. Copeland, The Church-Turing Thesis, op. cit.
7 See S. Harnad, Computation Is just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation; Co-
gnition Isn’t, “Minds and Machines” 4 (1994) iss. 4, p. 379–390; A. M. Turing, Com-
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a specific and immutable meaning. If we assume, in relation to the 
Church-Turing Thesis, that computations are universal, everything 
can be subjected to a formal interpretation. Every event, every rela-
tionship and every object of the world can be represented with sym-
bols used by a Turing machine. However, we distinguish consistently 
computational processes from different kinds of things, e.g. mental 
states, emotions, or feelings. None of those can be implemented (so 
far) through symbolic systems in a computing machine. The reason 
is the way living organisms are grounded.
2. Meaning and grounding
Symbol grounding is strongly connected with meaning. That makes 
the symbol interpreted in a particular way. In an artificial system, 
the interpretation of the symbolic system is not directly related 
to the system, but rather projected onto it by a programmer.8 The 
programmer is a translator, who implements his own symbols, de-
pending on his own meaning, in the artificial system. Such a sys-
tem is deprived of certain “freedom of interpretation” depended on 
the context or relationship in which the symbol is perceived by the 
interpreter. On the contrary, living organisms are grounded direct-
ly in the world and thus are significantly different from computers. 
They do not need an interpreter to know objects and understand 
relationships. The meaning of symbols is grounded in their ability 
to interact with the real world of objects, events, and states. Sym-
bols they use are consistently interpreted as referring to something. 
They have a meaning here and now.
In formal computations performed by a Turing machine, sym-
bol operations (read, write, move, stop) are performed on the basis 
of their shapes. They are syntactic operations as opposed to seman-
tic operations, which underlie the meaning of the symbols. That is 
more than the form itself. Meaning does not play any role in the 
puting Machinery and Intelligence, “Mind” (1950), p. 433–460.
8 See S. Harnad, The Symbol Grounding…, op. cit.
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formal definition of computations. There are symbols and ways of 
combining them into longer formulas, using rules of logic and math-
ematical principles. However, symbols themselves are devoid of se-
mantics. On the other hand, all these manipulations are somehow 
significant. Symbols refer to specific actions and allow understand-
ing of formulas. Even the shape of symbols refers to something. In 
the Turing machine processes, the symbol “0” means something else 
than an ellipse. The head reads out a symbol and performs an appro-
priate operation (it does not go around in circles, but moves forward 
or backward above the tape). Therefore, this feature of computation 
process contains a criterion that does not directly derive from the 
definition of computation,9 but contains a premise that the symbol 
is interpreted during the computation. Besides, all interpretations 
of symbols and operations must be homologous with each other, as 
is the case in mathematics or logic. There must be a sense, both in 
its entirety and in its parts.10 Therefore, computation of sentences 
is the hallmark of semantic interpretation. There is also an analo-
gy to living organisms, which are reading the meaning.
According to a variation of Turing machines, computations ap-
pear as symbol manipulations.11 The machine reads symbols placed 
on the tape in the form of images. The read head can move over the 
tape forward or backward,12 it can stop, read, write or overwrite the 
symbols. The machine is built in such a way that reading, writing 
and stopping are determined by the current state and by the symbol 
that has been read. The state can be described as acting “read, and 
if it is 1, move the tape to the left and return to that state; if it is 0, 
stop”. Turing machine is an abstract idealization of the use of a sym-
bolic system. The computer is a concrete physical implementation of 
9 See G. Piccinini, Computation in Physical Systems, in: The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-
-physicalsystems (28.11.2017).
10 See J. Fodor, Z. W. Pylyshyn, Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Cri-
tical Analysis, “Cognition” 28 (1988) iss. 1, p. 3–71.
11 See A. Turing, Intelligent Machinery, a Heretical Theory, “B. Jack Copeland” 
(2004), p. 465.
12 See A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery…, op. cit.
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a symbolic system. It is a dynamic system whose states and sequenc-
es of states are interpreted objects. It is worth to point out once again 
that symbols processed on the basis of shapes in the system are in-
terpreted, so one can talk about the meaning to which they refer.
3. Symbol arbitrariness
Another important feature of computations is that symbols cannot 
be arbitrary with regard to their interpretation. For example, the 
symbol “=” is manipulated on the basis of its shape, and it refers 
exclusively to the physical property of “equality”. Nevertheless, it 
does not refer to the concept of equality or causality, e.g.: it cannot 
be interpreted as a multiple of the symbol “–”. Likewise, symbols of 
a natural language have the same property of flexibility with respect 
to what they mean.13 The relationship between the form of the sign 
is communicated and determined by convention or agreement. The 
sign “=” means that the “first part of the sentence before the sym-
bol has the same value as the second part of the sentence after the 
symbol”; it is an arbitrary signal where the shape is the major val-
ue (two parallel lines); its size or color are completely unimportant.14
A formal system of language can be considered as a natural lan-
guage, because it has a syntax that generates correct statements, 
and these statements are interpreted as meaningful. All formal lan-
guages are a subset of natural language.15 This is the source of the 
risk of reference of computation to cognition. The arbitrariness of 
a symbol shape in a symbolic system causes people to use seman-
tics to interpret computational processes. Living minds do not use 
a formal language to think. They need to use semantics to interpret 
computational processes. In the world of living organisms, this con-
vention combines the meaning of characters with certain meanings, 
13 See C. S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 1, 
ed. N. Houser, Bloomington 1998.
14 See F. De Saussure, Nature of the Linguistic Sign, “Course in General Lingu-
istics” (1916), p. 65–70.
15 See S. Harnad, Computation Is just Interpretable…, op. cit.
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which may change depending on the context. Any object, event or 
state of affairs cannot be treated computationally, because, depend-
ing on many variables, it can be interpreted as a different symbolic 
description. The syntactic ambiguity is very frequent in real world. 
It arises from the relationship between words and the structure 
of a sentence. In other words, a sentence is syntactically ambigu-
ous when a receiver can reasonably interpret one sentence as hav-
ing more than one possible structure. For instance, the sign seen 
in streets “SLOW CHILDREN” provides evidence for several levels 
of underlying syntactic structure and can be interpreted as follows:
SLOW, CHILDREN. Information for drivers to slow, because 
there are children on the street.
SLOW CHILDREN. There are children moving very slowly.
SLOW, CHILDREN! Information for children to slow.
SLOW CHILDREN! Recommendation for a caregiver to slow 
children.
Can one talk about the relationship of these symbols in terms of 
computations? How many factors would be needed to formalize this 
relationship for an artificial system to be able to read the meaning 
of this sentence properly? In the case of semantic interpretation, the 
shapes of symbols are very arbitrary in relation to what is inter-
preted as meaning. Different logical formulas are needed to imple-
ment different descriptions of the sentence. It is required to specify 
the level of language description in which two separate structures 
may be assigned.
Turing machine operations neglect the semantic relationship 
between symbols and their meaning. The computations are inde-
pendent of the context. The meaning of the symbol system as well 
as the physical composition of the device are not relevant to the 
computation. It is formal properties that matter, not physical ones. 
If physical properties had an impact on the computation, the use 
of a Turing machine would be pointless. Moving away from physi-
cal data is what gives a Turing machine the power to perform any 
computations in general. The machine does not need a few things 
to perform mathematical operations. This computational independ-
ence, symbol manipulation and interpretation make it possible to 
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run any computation. Computers do what a trained one can do. 
We do not know all operations of the cognitive system, and com-
putations appear as a form characteristic of the human cognitive 
system. The ability to perform computations is unique, and since 
computers can do this, it may seem that we are dealing with some 
kind of thinking.
4. Semantic interpretation and Turing test
Alan Turing proposed a test,16 which assumed to recognize a ma-
chine as intelligent if a person does not distinguish the computer 
from another human in a conversation. The test is performed so 
that communication processes occur through the correspondence 
use of symbols. The Turing test was designed to prove that intel-
ligence (as a fundamental feature of living beings) can be a form 
of computation. The valid application of symbols will allow a ma-
chine to pass the test and lead to implementation of the mind. Un-
fortunately, supporters of this attitude have to face the argument 
of the Chinese Room.17 John Searle pointed out that any person can 
replace a machine in a correspondence test using a symbolic sys-
tem and without understanding any single sign of language. Such 
a person would perform a mechanical action without using his cog-
nitive skills. While computing is independent of implementation, it 
is a proof against any cognitive processes where a computer uses 
a particular symbol system in a deliberative way, thus disqualify-
ing it as an intelligent machine.
It seems, however, that Searle’s argument does not question the 
Turing test in its entirety, but only the possibility of purely sym-
bolic communication. Thus, only alternative use of an understand-
able symbolic system is susceptible to the argument of the Chinese 
Room. We do not know how to properly define intelligent behavior, 
16 See A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery…, op. cit.
17 See J. R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, “Behavioral and Brain Scien-
ces” 3 (1980) iss. 3, p. 417–424.
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but we know we and others exhibit it. One cannot be sure whether 
someone (human or machine) understands the symbols used.
Symbolic systems have the property of computing computable 
things. Accepting the physical version of the Church-Turing Thesis 
consists in assuming that such systems can do what a human can 
do. There is one important difference: a symbolic sequence, such as 
“2 + 2 = 4” or “SLOW CHILDREN”, can be generated by a symbol-
ic system, although interpretation of the latter requires reference 
to additional data not included in the system. The interpretation 
is influenced by many other factors that are additive and external 
to the formal symbol system. The meaning of symbols is grounded 
outside the system. Manipulation of symbols on the basis of shapes 
is not arbitrary in relation to what they mean for the interpreter. 
The meaning in a system is analogous to the meaning in the Chi-
nese Room if one does not know Chinese. The sequence of symbols 
is irrelevant if one looks at the input and output of data in the Chi-
nese Room. This applies to the whole process. The process itself is, 
however, devoid of any meaning and there is no way to ground it in 
the world of the machine. On the other hand, if one knows the ba-
sics of Chinese – there is a semantic interpretation. All the symbols 
here are fully defined, systematic, and consistent.
Here we find a critical divergence between computation and cog-
nition. We have no idea what our thoughts are, but there is one thing 
we can say for sure: thoughts are significant; they are always about 
something. They are not only properly interpreted – they are direct-
ly thought by the subject, without any intermediary. The symboli-
zation is based on the appropriate combination of symbols directly 
addressed without external interpretation or mediation.18
5. Robotic system and simulations
Steven Harnad discussed a solution to this problem: one Turing 
machine has to find its grounding in another machine, preferably 
18 See S. Harnad, The Symbol Grounding…, op. cit.
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a robotic system.19 Symbolic abilities can be grounded in the robot’s 
ability to connect to the world through sensor and motor devices. 
Such a robot would have its own skills of internal interpretation of 
objects, events and states of affairs. They are not interpreted by an 
external medium because the robot itself participates in the inter-
action and directly interprets everything in its own way. It deto-
nates “SLOW CHILDREN” in an analogous way a human does, tak-
ing into account the factors that give meaning to each element and 
the whole of this sentence. Symbol processing is semantically co-
herent and acquires meaning. It takes into account the context and 
chooses an adequate action. This ability applies to all things per-
ceived: present and absent, material and abstract. However, there 
is a price one has to pay for such a symbol grounding system: it in-
volves more than just computation. Sensorimotor transfer of signals 
is more than computation – even if it takes place through a formal 
system on the machine-machine path. The machine’s architect los-
es access to its internal meaning. Signals transmitted this way are 
interpreted directly by the artificial system without human inter-
vention. The symbol processing operations are interpreted by the 
machine, and they are quite different from the human cognitive pro-
cesses. It can be interpreted by humans, but this is a completely op-
posite situation. This time the machine – through the formal lan-
guage – translates symbols grounded in the world to the operator.
The weak variation of the Church-Turing Thesis is strictly for-
mal. It can be accepted, because every physical setup is formally 
equivalent to a Turing machine and everything can be simulated by 
the computer. Here is a need to stress that no one mistakes a sim-
ulation for reality (the exception being an active subject of virtual 
reality). The computer simulation does not provide the actual prop-
erties of world. During operation of a helicopter simulator cockpit, 
one does not actually fly, but rather the program simulates a flight 
in simulated air. There is only experience of the form of compu-
tation. The procedure is independent of a particular implementa-
tion and it is an interpretation of computer symbol manipulation. 
19 See S. Harnad, Computation Is just Interpretable…, op. cit.
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Symbols are interpreted as a helicopter cockpit, a flight, air, a per-
son taking part in the Turing test or a robot. There are actual dy-
namic simulation animations of objects. A virtual object in a virtu-
al world is only a symbol interpreted by the system. We are forced 
to rely on computational modeling, which is a great way to under-
stand physical systems.
Conclusions
Any simulation supports the strong Church-Turing Thesis. Even 
with the ability of a well-grounded robot to simulate the qualities 
of cognition, we are still faced with an incomprehensible symbolic 
system that is completely dissimilar to the cognitive system of liv-
ing organisms. The misunderstanding of the system makes it un-
intelligent for the perceiver. The robotic symbol grounding cannot 
be transferred through a sensorimotor system to create a simula-
tion corresponding to human concepts. Someone who encounters the 
simulation does not understand what is happening between the in-
put and output data. A formal language is understandable, but oth-
er data, like noise considered as distortion, remains incomprehen-
sible. Even if one could understand it, it would be only grounding 
of the system as a whole, through an external mediator. The pro-
grammer could analyze it in a human way. The system itself would 
remain a purely symbolic system. The cognition would still be dif-
ferent from the computation. The cognitive artificial system may be 
perceived only as an action in the “mind” of the cognizant.
Thus, there exists a gap between cognition and computation, 
which is unlikely to be closed. The reason is the way a system 
grounds its symbols in the world and how the process of its inter-
pretation unfolds. It is possible to prove there is a way of grounding 
symbols of an artificial system and there exists a sort of its semantic 
interpretation, but one cannot accept that it is similar to the activi-
ties of living organisms. It is exactly the problem of symbol ground-
ing and the result of anthropocentric attitude that lead to funda-
mental problems in the study of Artificial Intelligence.
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Summary
Semantics and symbol grounding in Turing machine processes 
The aim of the paper is to present the underlying reason of the unsolved sym-
bol grounding problem. The Church-Turing Thesis states that a physical prob-
lem, for which there is an algorithm of solution, can be solved by a Turing 
machine, but machine operations neglect the semantic relationship between 
symbols and their meaning. Symbols are objects that are manipulated on rules 
based on their shapes. The computations are independent of the context, men-
tal states, emotions, or feelings. The symbol processing operations are inter-
preted by the machine in a way quite different from the cognitive processes. 
Cognitive activities of living organisms and computation differ from each oth-
er, because of the way they act in the real word. The result is the problem of 
mutual understanding of symbol grounding.
Keywords: Steven Harnad, symbolic system, semantic system, symbol 
grounding problem, Turing machine, Turing test, Church-Turing Thesis, arti-
ficial intelligent, cognition
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